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INTRODUCTION
On September 9, 2016, an estimated 24,000 inmates in at
least twenty-nine prisons across the United States refused to
work as part of a coordinated labor strike.1 Though the exact
† B.A., College of William and Mary, 2011; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2018;
Articles Editor, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 103. Many thanks to Professor Angela
Cornell for her invaluable review, feedback, and encouragement throughout the
writing process. I am also grateful for the work of the Cornell Law Review editors
and associates who helped prepare this Note for publication. Additional thanks to
the folks of the Letcher Governance Project, for inspiration.
1
Support Prisoner Resistance! Sept 9th 2016 Shakes History, IWW INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://iwoc.noblogs.org/
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number of participants is difficult to confirm, a member of the
committee that helped organize the strike states that this was
the largest prison strike in U.S. history.2 An inmate in a South
Carolina prison estimated that 350 of the 1,500 inmates there
participated in the strike, refusing to appear for work assignments in an on-site, privately owned furniture factory or as the
prison’s landscapers, janitors, and cooks.3 A Michigan Department of Corrections spokesperson said that inmates at one
Michigan facility did not report for kitchen work, forcing correctional officers to provide food.4 Four hundred inmates at that
facility also marched peacefully in the yard before the prison
went on lockdown.5 In Alabama, some corrections officers
joined in the strike to protest overcrowded and understaffed
prisons.6 The Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee
(“IWOC”), part of the Industrial Workers of the World labor
union, organized the strike through mailings and conference
calls to inmates and their families and through partnerships
with lawyers and activists.7 Through the strike, the inmates
and organizers aimed to call attention to a range of grievances,
including unfair pay for inmate work and inhumane prison
conditions.8
Casting light on and adding gravity to these issues is the
IWOC’s rallying call for the strike: “This is a Call to Action
Against Slavery in America.”9 The IWOC is one of many voices
in the growing discussion of prison labor as a form of modernpost/2016/09/14/support-prisoner-resistance-sept-9th-2016-shakes-history/
[http://perma.cc/4SUG-Y67E].
2
Alice Speri, The Largest Prison Strike in U.S. History Enters Its Second
Week, THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 16, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/09/16/
the-largest-prison-strike-in-u-s-history-enters-its-second-week/ [http://
perma.cc/2YB7-KUFK].
3
E. Tammy Kim, A National Strike Against “Prison Slavery,” THE NEW YORKER
(Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-national-strikeagainst-prison-slavery [http://perma.cc/T392-J7J3].
4
Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, Why Prisoners Across the Country Have Gone on
Strike, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 19, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2016/09/prison-strike-inmate-labor-work [http://perma.cc/5EB34XFQ].
5
Id.
6
Beth Schwartzapfel, A Primer on the Nationwide Prisoners’ Strike, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 27, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2016/09/27/a-primer-on-the-nationwide-prisoners-strike [http://perma.cc/
VDT8-558D].
7
Kim, supra note 3.
8
See Schwartzapfel, supra note 6.
9
Announcement of Nationally Coordinated Prisoner Workstoppage for Sept 9,
2016, IWW INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (Apr. 1, 2016), https://
iwoc.noblogs.org/post/2016/04/01/announcement-of-nationally-coordinatedprisoner-workstoppage-for-sept-9-2016/ [http://perma.cc/Z43S-9E3B].
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day slavery in the United States.10 The Louisiana State Penitentiary, also known as Angola, provides a stark example of
how inmate labor gives rise to these discussions. Located on
what was once a slave plantation, Angola is now home to a
program under which inmates work in the same plantation
fields for as little as two cents per hour.11 The prison can force
the inmates to work after a doctor clears them and is not legally
required to compensate them.12 Section 1 of the Thirteenth
Amendment authorizes this program when it provides that
“[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States . . . .”13 Programs
like those at Angola also exist because legislatures and courts
have prevented traditional labor and employment law rights
and protections from applying to incarcerated workers.14
This Note seeks to demonstrate that labor law can provide
one avenue for remedying some of the grievances of incarcerated workers.15 In particular, this Note argues that the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB” or “the Board”) August
2016 decision regarding the right of graduate student assistants to unionize in Columbia University16 creates a particularly
relevant opening for arguing that incarcerated workers are also
able to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA” or “the Act”). Part I of this Note provides background
information on the prison system in the United States and the
ways in which inmate labor occurs within it, as well as on the
NLRA and the NLRB. Part II lays the groundwork for the application of Columbia University to the situation of incarcerated
10
See Whitney Benns, American Slavery, Reinvented, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 21,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-inamerica/406177/ [http://perma.cc/K7FM-C4SU]; Carimah Townes, ‘It’s Just
Dressed Up Slavery’: America’s Shadow Workforce Rises Up Against Prison Labor,
THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 9, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/its-just-dressed-upslavery-america-s-shadow-workforce-rises-up-against-prison-labor-e8ee1b5a87
38 [http://perma.cc/S68B-4KQ4]; Nicky Woolf, Inside America’s Biggest Prison
Strike: ‘The 13th Amendment Didn’t End Slavery,’ THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/22/inside-us-prison-strikelabor-protest [http://perma.cc/L87P-NKGS]; 13th (Kandoo Films 2016).
11
Benns, supra note 10.
12
Id.
13
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
14
See Eric M. Fink, Union Organizing & Collective Bargaining for Incarcerated
Workers, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 953, 955 (2016).
15
The proposals in this Note are proposals for changes that will occur within
the United States’ existing incarceration system. However, they could also operate as part of movements that call for the abolition of this system itself. See
ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 103–04 (2003).
16
N.L.R.B. Case No. 02-RC-143012.
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workers by providing an overview of decisions regarding the
status of incarcerated workers under labor and employment
statutes before Columbia University and of the Board’s decision
in Columbia University. Part III contrasts the Board’s reasoning in Columbia University with these earlier decisions and argues that the Board has set itself up to disagree with their
reasoning and in fact has interpreted the Act such that incarcerated workers should be protected under it. Part III also
raises and addresses a number of potential obstacles to incarcerated worker unionization and contends that none of these
obstacles must necessarily prevent their unionization. Though
Part III also reveals that the number of incarcerated workers
who would currently fall under the Act’s protection is somewhat limited, this Note argues that, in light of the ways in
which prison labor is a form of modern-day slavery, the Board,
the courts, and the public should seize this opportunity to
establish a foundation for incarcerated worker unionization.17
I
BACKGROUND
A. The U.S. Prison System
The structure of the prison system in the United States and
how inmate labor occurs within it will affect the application of
the NLRB’s decision in Columbia University to incarcerated
worker unionization, as discussed in greater detail in Part III of
this Note. In the United States, federal prisons hold individuals
charged or convicted with federal crimes.18 Each state also has
its own prison system, and municipalities and counties typically operate the country’s jails.19 In 2014, federal prisons held
210,567 individuals and state prisons held 1,351,752 individuals.20 Local jails held an additional 744,600 individuals.21
At both the federal and state level, prisons are operated by
either the government or private corporations.22 In 2014, government-operated (or “public”) federal prisons held 169,500
17
For another argument in favor of supporting incarcerated worker unionization even on a relatively small scale, see Fink, supra note 14, at 956.
18
BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENF’T AFFAIRS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING AND EVALUATING PRISON SYSTEMS 8 (2012).
19
Id. at 9.
20
E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BJS BULL. NO. NCJ 250229, PRISONERS IN 2015 3 (2016).
21
DANIELLE KAEBLE, ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BJS BULL. NO. NCJ 249513, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014
2 (2015).
22
See id. at 22.
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individuals, and privately operated federal prisons and community correction centers23 held 40,000 individuals.24 At the
state level, government-operated state prisons held 1,172,600
individuals and privately operated state prisons held 91,200
individuals in 2014.25 In the United States, the two largest
private prison corporations are CoreCivic (formerly known as
Corrections Corporation of America) and The GEO Group.26
These corporations design, construct, expand, and manage the
prisons they operate.27 Both CoreCivic and The GEO Group
operate prisons under contracts with the federal government
and with state governments.28
On August 18, 2016, then-U.S. Deputy Attorney General
Sally Q. Yates sent a memo to the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(“the Bureau”) directing it to either decline to renew or substantially reduce the scope of its contracts with private prison corporations as the contracts expired.29 The federal government’s
move away from contracting with private prison corporations
was a result of reports showing that private prisons do not
provide the same level of correctional services, programs, resources, safety, or security that public prisons provide.30 However, on February 23, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
issued a memorandum reversing the Obama-era policy.31 In
the memo, Attorney General Sessions directed the Bureau to
23
More commonly known as “halfway houses,” private companies operate
these centers under contracts with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. See Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates to the Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons 1
n.1 (Aug. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Yates Memorandum].
24
KAEBLE, supra note 21, at 22.
25
Id.
26
Chico Harlan, The Private Prison Industry Was Crashing – Until Donald
Trump’s Victory, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/10/the-private-prison-industry-wascrashing-until-donald-trumps-victory/?utm_term=.De35a7a79888 [http://
perma.cc/Y9UH-S755].
27
See Who We Are, CORECIVIC, http://www.cca.com/who-we-are [http://per
ma.cc/8GGB-G4M3].
28
Management & Operations, THE GEO GROUP, INC., http://www.geogroup.
com/Management_and_Operations [http://perma.cc/U85L-DXS9]; See CCA’s
Nationwide System of Correctional Centers, CORECIVIC, http://www.cca.com/locations [http://perma.cc/J57N-YK6E].
29
Yates Memorandum, supra note 23, at 2.
30
Id. at 1–2.
31
See Matt Zapotosky, Justice Department Will Again Use Private Prisons,
WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/justice-department-will-again-use-private-prisons/2017/02/23/da39
5d02-fa0e-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.691e37802931
[http://perma.cc/BH3S-3KA8].
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return to its previous, unrestricted approach to contracting
with private prisons.32
B. Prison Labor in the United States
The latest census of federal and state prisons reports that
in 2005, 88% of these facilities offered inmate work programs.33 More than half (54%) of the inmates at facilities offering work programs had work assignments.34 At the time of the
census, a much higher percentage of public facilities (97%)
offered work assignments to inmates than did private facilities
(56%).35 The distinction between federal and state facility offerings was less drastic—work assignments were available to
inmates in 98% of federal facilities and 87% of state facilities.36
An article from 2014 provides more recent figures and estimates that 870,000 inmates worked full time in 2014.37 Inmates in public federal prisons are required to work if they are
medically able,38 and the same is also true for some public
state prisons.39
Prison work programs consist of different jobs and come in
different organizational systems. In the most common “state
account” system, the government department that operates the
prison wholly manages the work program, sells the product,
and receives the revenue.40 In the case of public federal prisons, this system takes the form of the wholly owned government corporation, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., also known
as UNICOR.41 UNICOR operates 110 factories at 79 federal
prisons.42 UNICOR’s incarcerated workers take calls at call
32

See id.
JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2005, at 5 (2008).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Beth Schwartzapfel, Modern-Day Slavery in America’s Prison Workforce,
THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (May 28, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/great-ameri
can-chain-gang [http://perma.cc/PWW6-T9NL].
38
Work Programs, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/
custody_and_care/work_programs.jsp [http://perma.cc/HNW7-EYES].
39
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-26.
40
See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and
the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857,
869–70 (2008).
41
See Program Details, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/in
mates/custody_and_care/unicor_about.jsp [http://perma.cc/LGS5-E8P2].
42
Caitlin Seandel, Prison Labor: Three Strikes and You’re Hired, ELLA BAKER
CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: ELLA’S VOICE (June 27, 2013), http://ellabakercenter.org/
blog/2013/06/prison-labor-is-the-new-slave-labor [http://perma.cc/B2KEFCK4].
33
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centers, repair vehicles, and make furniture, among many
other things.43 These workers receive approximately $0.04 of
each $1.00 in UNICOR sales revenue.44 Every state also has its
own UNICOR-like prison industry program,45 although incarcerated workers in some of these programs do not receive any
payment.46
Under a “contract” system, a private firm, rather than the
government, operates the work program pursuant to a contract
with the prison.47 Workers in this type of system remain in the
prison’s custody while they work.48 Work release programs, in
which inmates are permitted to work for pay in the community
during the day,49 also fall under the umbrella of contract systems. Though the federal government does not use a contract
labor system in any of its prisons, public state prisons have
work programs operating under this system. According to a
1995 Department of Justice report, Escod Industries, a private
corporation, operates a manufacturing plant at Evans Correctional Facility, a public South Carolina prison.50 Incarcerated
workers there assemble electronic cables that Escod has sold
to companies like IBM.51 At Perry Correctional Institute, another public South Carolina prison, incarcerated workers assemble wooden furniture for an on-site private company.52
Though it is not clear from the limited information that
CoreCivic and The GEO Group provide, these private prison
corporations could operate their work programs under either a
state account-like system or a contract system. CoreCivic
43
See UNICOR Schedule of Products and Services, UNICOR, https://www.
unicor.gov/SOPalphalist.aspx [http://perma.cc/7ZZF-CVDM].
44
Program Details, supra note 41.
45
Sarah Shemkus, Beyond Cheap Labor: Can Prison Work Programs Benefit
Inmates?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/2015/dec/09/prison-work-program-ohsa-whole-foods-in
mate-labor-incarceration [http://perma.cc/2BW2-ZAXD]; see, e.g., About
CALPIA, STATE OF CAL. PRISON INDUS. AUTH., http://www.calpia.ca.gov/About_PIA/
AboutPIA.aspx [http://perma.cc/S5HX-PVXK].
46
See Patrice A. Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh Economic Reality of Working Inmates, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 679, 694 (2015)
(noting that the Georgia Department of Corrections does not pay incarcerated
workers).
47
See Zatz, supra note 40, at 870.
48
See Fink, supra note 14, at 958.
49
See MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., WORK RELEASE PROGRAM 1 (2012), https://mn.
gov/doc/assets/WorkRelease_tcm1089-276329.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR29EJMY].
50
GEORGE E. SEXTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WORK IN AMERICA’S PRISONS: JOINT
VENTURES WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR 5 (1995).
51
Id.
52
Kim, supra note 3.
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states that work assignments for its inmates can include building or manufacturing goods.53 In addition, CoreCivic offers
“vocational training” that includes industry work programs
that “put inmates to work in modern programs that are aligned
closely with outside companies.”54 CoreCivic states that these
programs are either operated independently or through the
Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program, which is
discussed in greater detail below.55 The GEO Group notes only
that it offers vocational programming that includes on-the-job
training and partnerships with local employers.56 Neither corporation provides information on incarcerated worker salaries.
However, one source estimates that they receive as little as
$0.17 per hour for a maximum of six hours per day, which
totals $20.00 per month.57 At the highest-paying private
prison in Tennessee, which CoreCivic runs, the same source
reports that incarcerated workers receive $0.50 per hour for
highly skilled positions.58
In addition to working under these two systems, incarcerated workers often contribute to the prison’s day-to-day operations.59 In public federal prisons, inmates work in food service
and as orderlies, plumbers, painters, and groundskeepers.60
These workers receive $0.12 to $0.40 per hour.61 Public state
prisons also use incarcerated workers to maintain day-to-day
facility operations and maintenance.62 Additionally, CoreCivic
states that its incarcerated workers serve as custodial assistants or food service attendants.63
Since the early 1900s, when labor unions and small businesses concerned with unfair competition from goods produced
by incarcerated workers put pressure on the federal govern53
Work Assignments, CORECIVIC, http://www.cca.com/inmate-services/in
mate-reentry-preparation/work-assignments [http://perma.cc/S2N6-Z6MC].
54
Vocational Training, CORECIVIC, http://www.cca.com/inmate-services/in
mate-reentry-preparation/vocational-training [https://perma.cc/LT5V-CSUH].
55
Id.
56
In-Custody Programs, THE GEO GROUP, INC., http://www.geogroup.com/InCustody_Evidence_Based_Programs [http://perma.cc/ZG4Q-XKG9].
57
Vicky Peláez, The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a
New Form of Slavery?, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Aug. 28, 2016), http://www.glo
balresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-united-states-big-business-or-a-newform-of-slavery/8289 [http://perma.cc/8MGM-5USC].
58
Id.
59
See Zatz, supra note 40, at 870.
60
Work Programs, supra note 38.
61
Id.
62
See, e.g., HAWAII DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, POLICY NO. CORR. 14.02, INMATE WORK
PROGRAM/COMPENSATION (2010).
63
Work Assignments, supra note 53.
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ment, Congress has restricted the sale of these goods in interstate commerce.64 In 1935, Congress passed the AshurstSumners Act, which made it a federal crime to “knowingly
transport prison-made goods into a state that prohibited their
sale.”65 Congress then amended the Ashurst-Sumners Act in
1940 to make the interstate transportation and sale of prisonmade goods a federal crime regardless of state laws.66 However, this restriction does not apply to goods manufactured for
use by the federal government, the District of Columbia, state
governments, or political subdivisions of a state or non-profit
organization.67 As a result of the Ashurst-Sumners Act and its
exceptions, UNICOR sells its products almost exclusively to the
federal government,68 and state prison industry programs sell
only to state and local governments.69
Congress created an additional exception to the AshurstSumners Act when it created the Prison Industry Enhancement
Certification Program (“PIECP”) in 1979.70 The program exempts certified state and local departments of corrections from
the Ashurst-Sumners Act’s restrictions, permitting them to sell
goods produced by incarcerated workers in the open market.71
To become certified under the program, the state or local department of corrections must demonstrate that it meets the
requirements set out in the Mandatory Criteria for Program
Participation.72 As of September 30, 2016, forty-seven jurisdictions were PIECP-certified, and a total of 5,435 inmates
worked in programs in these jurisdictions.73 These programs
involve partnerships with private corporations, and these corporations either serve as customers of the departments of
corrections or as direct employers of incarcerated workers.74
64

See Fink, supra note 14, at 958.
Fulcher, supra note 46, at 689.
66
Id.
67
See 18 U.S.C. § 1761(b) (2012).
68
Customers and Private Sector FAQs, UNICOR, https://www.unicor.gov/
FAQ_Market_Share.aspx [http://perma.cc/7Z69-VQWL].
69
See Fink, supra note 14, at 958.
70
See DOMINGO S. HERRAIZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 1 (2004).
71
See id.
72
See id. at 3 for these requirements.
73
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM CERTIFICATION & COST ACCOUNTING CENTER LISTING, STATISTICS FOR THE QUARTER ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 at 1 (2016), http://
www.nationalcia.org/wp-content/uploads/Third-Quarter-2016-CertificationListing-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL95-47YR].
74
See id. at 3–4 (listing private corporations as participating in projects
under either a “customer” or “employer” model).
65
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PIECP-certified programs must pay wages “at a rate not less
than that paid for work of a similar nature in the locality in
which the work is performed.”75 However, departments of corrections are free to take deductions from the wages of incarcerated workers for taxes, room and board, family support, and
victims’ compensation, and these deductions can total up to
80% of a worker’s gross wages.76 For the quarter ending September 30, 2016, PIECP-certified programs resulted in gross
wages of $11,104,906, but after deductions, net wages to incarcerated workers were only $4,780,857.77 Thus, each incarcerated worker in a PIECP-certified program made an average
of approximately $98.00 each month in 2016.
C. The National Labor Relations Act and the National
Labor Relations Board
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935
to eliminate obstructions to the free flow of commerce, including industrial strife and unequal bargaining power between
employers and employees, by “encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.”78 To achieve
this end, the Act forbids employers from interfering with, restraining, or discharging individuals engaged in protected activities, which include self-organization, collective bargaining,
and engaging in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.79 These
protections only apply to individuals who fall within the statute’s definition of “employee.”80 Further, they only apply to
75

HERRAIZ, supra note 70, at 3.
Id.
77
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM QUARTERLY REPORT, STATISTICS FOR THE QUARTER
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 at 3 (2016), http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-content/
uploads/Third-Quarter-2016-Statistical-Data-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W7AX-LG8V].
78
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
79
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–58 (2012).
80
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations . . . .” (emphasis added)). The
statute defines “employee” as “any employee . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any
individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the
76
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employees who work for employers that are covered by the Act,
a category that excludes the federal and state governments.81
The NLRA also establishes the National Labor Relations
Board, which consists of five members that are appointed by
the President for five-year terms.82 The Board primarily acts as
a quasi-judicial body,83 deciding cases regarding unfair labor
practices under the Act.84 However, the Board also oversees
the union election process, which occurs when employees submit a petition to the Board to certify or decertify a union as
their bargaining representative.85 Additionally, the Board fills
gaps in the NLRA by engaging in rulemaking or by announcing
policies and rules in the matters it adjudicates.86 The Board
relies almost exclusively on adjudication, rather than rulemaking, to establish rules and policies.87 Notably, the doctrine of
stare decisis, which refers to courts’ practice of adhering to a
previous decision when that decision addresses the issue
before the court,88 does not strictly apply to the Board’s adjudicatory process.89 However, circuit courts have held that “the
Board may not depart . . . from its usual rules of decision to
reach a different, unexplained result in a single case.”90 In
addition, the Board does refer to its prior decisions as “prece-

Railway Labor Act . . . or by any other person who is not an employer as herein
defined.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
81
See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (defining “employer” as “any person acting as
an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include . . . any State
or political subdivision thereof”).
82
29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012).
83
The Board, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/
board [http://perma.cc/M2ZJ-LJB8].
84
See Decide Cases, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-wedo/decide-cases [http://perma.cc/6FPM-E9CP].
85
See Conduct Elections, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/whatwe-do/conduct-elections [http://perma.cc/34ZB-A2J8].
86
See TANJA L. THOMPSON & R. BRADLEY MOKROS, AS THE PENDULUM SWINGS: THE
ROLE OF PRECEDENT IN NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISIONS 1 (2009).
87
See Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking:
Rulemaking vs. Adjudication, 64 EMORY L.J. 1470, 1471 (2015).
88
See Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
89
See THOMPSON & MOKROS, supra note 86, at 1 n.3 (citing NLRB v. Kostel
Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 1971) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis does not
require that Board policies and standards be unchangeable since it must meet
changing industrial conditions by corresponding changes in policies and
standards.”)).
90
NLRB v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 925, 460 F.2d 589, 604
(5th Cir. 1972) (citing Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964)).
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dent,”91 and it considers the facts and reasoning of these decisions when it addresses similar situations.92
II
INCARCERATED WORKERS THEN, COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY NOW
A. Incarcerated Workers as Employees before Columbia
University
Neither the NLRB nor a federal court has specifically considered whether incarcerated workers are employees under the
NLRA.93 However, federal courts have addressed whether incarcerated workers in work release programs were properly
included in a collective bargaining unit with other employees
under the NLRA.94 These courts found that incarcerated workers on work release could be included in bargaining units
alongside non-incarcerated employees under the Act.95 These
holdings would be consistent with including incarcerated
workers in general as employees under the NLRA.96
Federal courts have also addressed whether incarcerated
workers are employees under two other federal labor and employment statutes—the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).97 The definition of “employee” in these two statutes is very similar to that in
the NLRA;98 thus, looking to judicial opinions regarding
whether incarcerated workers meet the definition of “employee”
under the FLSA and Title VII is useful for considering their
status as employees under the NLRA.
In his article on the economic dimensions of employment
relationships, Noah D. Zatz categorizes the ways in which
91
See Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 (1999) (“The Petitioner,
mindful of the Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s Hospital precedent, requests that the
Board overrule that precedent.”).
92
See id. at 159.
93
See Fink, supra note 14, at 966.
94
See Speedrack Prods. Grp., Ltd. v. NLRB, 114 F.3d 1276, 1278–82 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Rosslyn Concrete Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 713 F.2d 61, 63–64 (4th Cir.
1983).
95
See Rosslyn Concrete, 713 F.2d at 64; cf. Speedrack Prods., 114 F.3d at
1282 (holding that the NLRB’s decision that the work release inmates did not
share a community of interest with other unit employees and thus could not be
part of the bargaining unit was unreasonable).
96
See Fink, supra note 14, at 966–67.
97
See Zatz, supra note 40, at 882 nn.101–02 (collecting cases).
98
FLSA defines an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.”
29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012). Title VII also defines an employee as “an individual
employed by an employer.” 42 U.S.C § 2000e(f). The NLRA states that “[t]he term
‘employee’ shall include any employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
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courts have evaluated whether incarcerated workers are protected under the FLSA and Title VII.99 The vast majority of
these courts have concluded that incarcerated-worker claims
for protection under these statutes fail.100 Zatz explains that
this conclusion is a result of courts adopting an “exclusive
market” approach to determining what constitutes employment.101 Under this approach, courts find that incarcerated
workers and the institutions for which they work are in
nonmarket or noneconomic relationships, and thus they are
not employees and employers in an employment
relationship.102
Many of these courts conclude that the relationship between incarcerated workers and the institutions for which they
work is nonmarket or noneconomic by conflating economic relationships with contractual relationships.103 As Zatz explains, this type of reasoning has three components: there is no
free contract when prison labor is involuntary; there is no contract when there is no exchange between the parties; and
whatever exchange exists between the parties fails to take the
form of a discrete bargain.104 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Morgan v. MacDonald illustrates the first two of these components. There, the court states:
Under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 209.461, all inmates are required to
work or receive training for 40 hours each week. Thus, Morgan was in no sense free to bargain with would-be employers
for the sale of his labor; his work at the prison was merely an
incident of his incarceration. Morgan and the prison didn’t
contract with one another for mutual economic gain, as
would be the case in a true employment relationship; their
affiliation was “penological, not pecuniary.” Because the economic reality of Morgan’s work at the prison clearly indicates
that his labor “belonged to the institution,” he cannot be
deemed an employee under the FLSA.105
99

See Zatz, supra note 40, at 886–891.
Compare id. at 882 nn.101–02 (collecting over forty-five cases in which
courts found no employment relationship), with id. at 883 n.103 (collecting seven
cases in which courts found that there could be an employment relationship at
the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage).
101
See id. at 882.
102
See id.
103
See id. at 885; see also Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir.
1994) (stating that “[p]risoners are essentially taken out of the national economy
upon incarceration. When they are assigned work within the prison for purposes
of training and rehabilitation, they have not contracted with the government to
become its employees.”).
104
See Zatz, supra note 40, at 885.
105
41 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

R

100

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN104.txt

190

unknown

Seq: 14

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

9-NOV-17

10:05

[Vol. 103:177

The Fourth Circuit illustrates the third component when it
notes in Harker v. State Use Industries that the parties “do not
deal at arms’ length.”106 Thus, as Zatz explains, they do not
encounter each other as strangers who engage in a discrete
bargain.107 Key to both of these decisions is that the courts’
reasoning leads to the conclusion that the relationship between
incarcerated workers and the institutions for which they work
is a noneconomic relationship. Then, under the exclusive market approach, they are also not in an employment relationship.
Other courts do not focus on whether the relationship is a
market or economic one before finding that an incarcerated
worker is not an employee under the FLSA or Title VII. Instead,
they focus on the presence of other relationships between the
two parties and find that these other relationships preclude the
existence of an employment one. For example, in Williams v.
Meese, the Tenth Circuit held that an incarcerated worker was
not an employee under Title VII or the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act because:
[Plaintiff’s] relationship with the Bureau of Prisons, and
therefore, with the defendants, arises out of his status as an
inmate, not an employee. Although his relationship with defendants may contain some elements commonly present in
an employment relationship, it arises “from [plaintiff’s] having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the
[defendants’] correctional institution. The primary purpose
of their association [is] incarceration, not employment.”108

If the NLRB were to use this reasoning, or reasoning based in
contract theory, to evaluate incarcerated worker claims for protection under the NLRA, these claims would fail because both
lines of reasoning lead to the conclusion that incarcerated
workers are not statutory employees.
B. The NLRB’s Decision in Columbia University
In its August 2016 Columbia University decision, the NLRB
found that graduate student assistants are employees under
the NLRA.109 In doing so, it overturned Brown University, a
2004 Board decision holding that graduate student assistants
were not employees under the NLRA because they “are primarily students and have a primarily educational, not economic,
106

990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993).
See Zatz, supra note 40, at 891–92.
108
926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Prisoner Not Protected From
Racial Job Bias, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 6865, at 7009 (Apr. 18, 1986)).
109
See N.L.R.B. Case No. 02-RC-143012 at *1.
107
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relationship with their university.”110 The Columbia University
Board said regarding this reasoning:
The fundamental error of the Brown University Board was to
frame the issue of statutory coverage not in terms of the
existence of an employment relationship, but rather on
whether some other relationship between the employee and
the employer is the primary one—a standard neither derived
from the statutory text of Section 2(3) nor from the fundamental policy of the Act.111

According to this decision, as long as there is an employment
relationship, the existence of some other relationship not covered by the Act does not prevent an individual from being protected as an employee.112 Further, the Columbia University
Board notes:
The Board and the courts have repeatedly made clear that
the extent of any required “economic” dimension to an employment relationship is the payment of tangible compensation. Even when such an economic component may seem
comparatively slight, relative to other aspects of the relationship between worker and employer, the payment of compensation, in conjunction with the employer’s control, suffices to
establish an employment relationship for purposes of the
Act.113

The Board then explains that multiple relationships between
employers and employees can coexist because the Act permits
the Board to define the scope of the mandatory bargaining over
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
that will occur between employers and employees.114 Thus,
because employees and employers must bargain only about
subjects related to their employment relationship, this bargaining need not implicate their other relationships.
The Columbia University decision builds upon similar reasoning by the Board in Boston Medical Center Corp. In that
decision, the Board overruled an earlier finding that interns
and residents in hospitals were not employees under the NLRA
because they were primarily serving as students rather than
employees.115 The Boston Medical Center Corp. Board said of
that reasoning, “residents and fellows fall within the broad definition of ‘employee’ under Section 2(3), notwithstanding that a
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 1.
Id. at 6.
See id. at 6.
See Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 (1999).
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purpose of their being at a hospital may also be, in part,
educational.”116
III
INCARCERATED WORKERS AS EMPLOYEES UNDER THE
NLRA AFTER COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY:
APPLICATION AND OBSTACLES
A. Applying Columbia University
The Board’s language in Boston Medical Center and Columbia University contrasts markedly with the earlier reasoning
regarding incarcerated workers under labor and employment
statutes described in Part II of this Note. Both Board decisions
emphasize that the relationship between an employee and an
employer need not be primarily one of employment. Indeed, the
Columbia University Board declares that it is a fundamental
error to adopt this approach when determining statutory coverage.117 Instead, the Board emphasizes that the focus should
be on whether an employment relationship exists, regardless of
whether it exists alongside other relationships. This approach
forecloses the line of reasoning that the court used in Williams
v. Meese to conclude that incarcerated workers were not employees. Further, the Columbia University Board notes that it
has “repeatedly made clear” that the only economic dimension
necessary for an employment relationship is the payment of
tangible compensation—and an employment relationship requires only this payment plus employer control over the employee.118 This minimal requirement for the economic
component of employment relationships does away with the
extensive work that courts have done to find that incarcerated
workers are in noneconomic relationships with their employer
institutions because the relationships lack aspects of contract
ones.
This comparison shows that the Board has set itself up to
disagree with the reasoning described in Part II of this Note that
finds that incarcerated workers are not in employment relationships with the institutions in which they work. Moreover,
the Board’s established approach to determining if an employment relationship is present—looking to the presence of employer control and payment of compensation—accommodates
many incarcerated workers. As described in Part I of this Note,
116
117
118

Id. at 160.
N.L.R.B. Case No. 02-RC-143012 at *5.
Id.
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incarcerated workers are often paid for their labor, though the
amount of pay is generally very small. Further, courts have
acknowledged that the relationship between these workers and
their employers meets a control test.119 Taken together, this
suggests that the Board has created an opening for finding that
incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA.120
However, such a finding would not guarantee a clear path
to unionization for incarcerated workers. The remainder of this
Part discusses additional obstacles that will likely arise on this
path and argues that none of these obstacles must necessarily
prevent incarcerated worker unionization. Further, it argues
that the Board and courts should make a strong effort to overcome these obstacles in light of the ways that incarcerated
worker labor is a form of modern-day slavery.
B. The Board’s Statutory and Discretionary Jurisdiction
Because Congress passed the NLRA pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause,121 the NLRB’s statutory
jurisdiction over a case depends on an employer’s activity in
interstate commerce.122 The Board has established standards
for asserting this statutory jurisdiction, which it describes as
“very broad.”123 For example, retailers fall under the Board’s
statutory jurisdiction if they have a gross annual volume of
business in interstate commerce of $500,000 or more.124
Though the Ashurst-Sumners Act prohibits the sale of goods
made by incarcerated workers in many channels of interstate
commerce, its exception for sales to federal and state governments very likely brings employers selling goods pursuant to
this exception under the statutory jurisdiction of the Board.
Employers selling goods under the PIE program also very likely
fall under the Board’s statutory jurisdiction because these
119
See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that
“there is obviously enough control over the prisoner”); Zatz, supra note 40, at 872
(“Since the 1980s, however, courts have accepted that prison labor usually satisfies the relevant tests for control.”); cf. Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8,
15 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim should not be dismissed on
summary judgment because there was sufficient evidence of control).
120
Notably, the General Counsel of the NLRB has already begun applying the
reasoning in Columbia University outside the context of graduate teaching assistants. See infra note 126.
121
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
122
See Jurisdictional Standards, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.
nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/jurisdictional-standards [http://perma.cc/XK5C-PX
GF].
123
Id.
124
Id.
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goods are allowed to enter the open market. These employers
would only have to meet the Board’s minimal sales volume
threshold. Thus, the Board’s requirements for asserting its
statutory jurisdiction will not likely prohibit it from considering
whether incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA.
Even when the NLRB has the statutory authority to consider and decide an issue, it may properly decline to assert its
jurisdiction over the issue when exercising jurisdiction would
not effectuate the policies underlying the NLRA.125 The Board’s
August 2015 decision in Northwestern University serves as a
recent example of the Board declining to exercise its jurisdiction over a case, and it shows that the Board’s reasons for
declining to exercise its jurisdiction are not applicable to the
situation of incarcerated workers.
In Northwestern University, the Board explains that asserting jurisdiction over a representation petition and determining
whether Northwestern University football players who receive
grant-in-aid scholarships are employees under the NLRA
would not effectuate the policies underlying the Act.126 The
Board emphasizes that this decision not to assert jurisdiction
is based on its findings regarding the nature of sports
leagues.127 Because of the control that leagues exercise over
the individual teams within them and the fact that the “overwhelming majority” of teams in the leagues are public schools,
125

See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951).
See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 3 (Aug. 17,
2015). On January 31, 2017, the General Counsel of the NLRB sent a memorandum to the Board’s regional directors stating that Division I Football Bowl Subdivision scholarship players in private universities are employees under the NLRA.
Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers 16 (Jan. 31, 2017). The General
Counsel notes that the Board’s decision in Northwestern University does not preclude this conclusion because the reasoning underlying the Board’s decision not
to assert jurisdiction over the players’ representation petition is not relevant to the
issue of whether the players are employees under the NLRA. See id. at 20. Thus,
regardless of whether the Board certifies the players’ petition to join a union, the
players still have the right under the Act to engage in concerted activities for
mutual aid or protection. See id. at 20–22. Though this memorandum does not
carry the force of law, and though President Trump’s General Counsel appointment may not continue the policies set forth in it, the memorandum is notable
because it relies on the Board’s reasoning in Boston Medical Center and Columbia
University to find that the football players at issue in Northwestern University are
employees under the NLRA. See id. at 18. Thus, it serves as support for the
argument that the reasoning in Columbia University applies outside of the context
of graduate teaching assistants. Further, it illustrates that even if the Board
declined to assert its discretionary jurisdiction over incarcerated workers, these
workers could still be employees protected by the Act based on the reasoning in
Columbia University.
127
See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 3.
126
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over which the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction, the Board
found that exercising its jurisdiction in this case would not
promote stability in labor relations.128 In particular, the Board
points to the “symbiotic relationship” among the various football teams, leagues, and the NCAA, which oversees them, and
argues that because of this relationship, labor issues involving
an individual team would also affect the leagues and the NCAA,
creating instability.129 The Board says of this context, “there is
no ‘product’ without direct interaction among the players and
cooperation among the various teams.”130
However, this is not the case in the context of incarcerated
worker labor. The products of incarcerated worker labor exist
without direct interaction between workers in one prison and
workers in another and without direct interaction between
public and private prison systems as a whole. Though it is true
that many inmates work in public prisons over which the
Board cannot exercise jurisdiction, the lack of direct interaction between these incarcerated workers and those in private
prisons means that Board decisions regarding workers in private institutions will not create instability in the system as a
whole. Further, as illustrated by the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction in Columbia University, the fact that a type of labor
exists in both a public and a private setting, as does graduate
student assistant labor, cannot be the sole reason that the
Board declines to exercise its jurisdiction. Given the coordinated and widespread strikes described in the introduction to
this Note, it is also clear that the policies of the Act—alleviating
industrial strife and unequal bargaining power between employers and employees—would be furthered if the Board exercised jurisdiction over incarcerated workers. Though these
distinctions between Northwestern University and the situation
of incarcerated workers do not ensure that the Board will exercise jurisdiction in a case involving these workers, they do
show that the issue of exercising jurisdiction should not necessarily prevent incarcerated worker unionization.

128
Id. Some have argued that the Board was incorrect in assuming that
exercising jurisdiction would result in instability in this context and that the
Board’s stability rationale, as a whole, cuts too broadly. See Ben Levin, Guest
Post: N.L.R.B. Missed Shot by Declining Jurisdiction in Northwestern Football Case
for “Stability,” ON LABOR (Aug. 20, 2015), https://onlabor.org/2015/08/20/
guest-post-n-l-r-b-missed-shot-by-declining-jurisdiction-in-northwestern-foot
ball-case-for-stability/ [http://perma.cc/H7UQ-C2JV].
129
See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 4–5.
130
Id. at 4.
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C. Employers in the Prison System
A Board finding that incarcerated workers are employees
under the NLRA would not grant protection to all prison labor
organizations because not all incarcerated workers have employers that are covered by the Act. Some employers of incarcerated workers are not covered by the Act because it excludes
federal and state governments from the employer category. As
described in Part I of this Note, many incarcerated workers
contribute to day-to-day prison operations in public institutions or work for government-owned corporations like UNICOR,
over which the Board has no jurisdiction.131 Other employers
are likely not covered by the Act because they do not meet the
interstate commerce requirements for the Board’s statutory jurisdiction. This is likely the case for the employment relationship between private institutions and incarcerated workers
contributing to prison operations for them. However, approximately 130,000 inmates currently live in federal and state private prisons, and though the structures of the labor systems
under which they work are not clear, some of these inmates
manufacture goods for the private prison or local employers.132
A Board finding that these incarcerated workers are employees
under, and thus protected by, the NLRA would move these
workers one step further from the forms of modern-day slavery
under which they currently work. The same could also be true
for the unknown number of inmates who work for private corporations inside public prisons, like those at Perry Correctional
Institute in South Carolina.
Because a Board finding that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA would primarily affect workers in private prisons, it is important to overcome the idea that these
private prisons are “political subdivision[s]” of a state or federal
government, a type of employer not covered by the Act.133 In
NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County, the
Supreme Court held that entities are political subdivisions of a
state if they are “either (1) created directly by the state, so as to
constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to
131
For an argument that government-owned prison industry corporations
should not be excluded from NLRA coverage because they are proprietary enterprises indistinguishable from their private-sector counterparts, see Fink, supra
note 14, at 967–68 n.102.
132
See supra text accompanying notes 53–56.
133
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (defining “employer” as “any person acting as an
agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include . . . any State or
political subdivision thereof”).
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public officials or to the general electorate.”134 Private prison
corporations are incorporated by private individuals rather
than the state,135 and their boards are not elected or appointed
by, and thus are not responsible to, public officials or the general electorate. Thus, these private prison corporations are not
political subdivisions. A decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia lends additional support to this claim. In
West Virginia ex rel. Youth Services Systems, Inc. v. Wilson, the
court held that “a private corporation that enters into a contract with an agency of this State for the provision of juvenile
detention services does not meet the definition of a ‘political
subdivision’ under the [Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform] Act.”136 Thus, the NLRA’s exemption of political
subdivisions from statutory coverage does not prohibit incarcerated worker unionization under the Act.
D. State Statutes and NLRA Preemption
As explained above, state private prisons and state public
prisons that host private corporations that use incarcerated
worker labor hold many of the workers who could receive protection under the NLRA. This situation implicates state laws
that govern labor relations alongside the NLRA, some of which
address the status of incarcerated workers as employees. For
example, a Florida statute governing public-sector labor relations states that “‘[p]ublic employee’ means any person employed by a public employer except: . . . . (f) [t]hose persons who
have been convicted of a crime and are inmates confined to
institutions within the state.”137 If the Board were to find that
incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA, many
state legislatures would likely add similar language in state
statutes governing private-sector labor relations in an attempt
to limit the reach of the Board’s finding. The ensuing conflict
134

402 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1971).
See The CCA Story: Our Company History, CORECIVIC, http://www.cca.
com/our-history [https://perma.cc/5LP6-V8DT] (“Back in 1983, three enterprising leaders came together . . . . T. Don Hutto, Tom Beasley and Doctor Crants
were each distinguished in their own right.”).
136
515 S.E.2d 594, 599 (W. Va. 1999). The Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act’s definition of “political subdivision” comports with the
Supreme Court’s definition of the term. See id. at 597 (citation omitted) (“The
term ‘political subdivision’ is defined . . . as: any county commission, municipality
and county board of education; any separate corporation or instrumentality established by one or more counties or municipalities, as permitted by law; any
instrumentality supported in most part by municipalities; any public body
charged by law with the performance of a government function and whose jurisdiction is coextensive with one or more counties, cities or towns . . . .”).
137
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 447.203(3)(f) (West 2013).
135
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between state statutes and the Board’s interpretation of the
NLRA would require a determination of whether the NLRA
preempts these state statutes.
A court evaluating whether the NLRA preempts state statutes that exclude incarcerated workers from the definition of
“employee” could find that the Act preempts these statutes
based on established precedent. In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that obvious, actual conflict between the Act and state statutes leads to “easy judicial exclusion of state action.”138 If the Board found that incarcerated
workers are employees under the Act, any state statutes excluding incarcerated workers from this definition would create
obvious, actual conflicts with the Act. As such, a court could
easily find that the Act preempts such state statutes.
In order to further protect the primary jurisdiction of the
Board to decide labor issues, the Supreme Court held in San
Diego Building Trades Council Local 2620 v. Garmon that the
NLRA preempts states from regulating conduct that is arguably
protected by the Act.139 Under Garmon preemption, however,
the NLRA does not preempt matters that are “deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility.”140 Courts have applied this
exception primarily to situations involving picketing, violence,
or injury to the person.141 Even in instances like these, however, NLRA preemption can occur if the state regulation significantly affects NLRA rights or procedures.142
Though the rule set out in Weber applies more directly to a
Board finding that incarcerated workers are employees under
the Act, a court could also look to Garmon to determine if such
a finding preempts conflicting state laws. Given that such a
finding would allow incarcerated workers to engage in conduct
protected by the Act, a court considering preemption under
Garmon could find that the Act preempts conflicting state laws,
notwithstanding the exception for matters deeply rooted in local feeling. Further, though a state’s general power over incarcerated people in its custody is arguably a matter deeply rooted
in local feeling and responsibility, the specific issue of whether
or not these people are employees under statutes governing
138

348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
359 U.S. 236, 243–44 (1959); see Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal
Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 13 LAB. L. 429, 431 (1998).
140
359 U.S. at 243–44.
141
See Befort, supra note 139, at 432.
142
See id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978); Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc., 355 U.S. 131
(1957)).
139
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labor relations is less so. This is especially true when contrasting this issue with those that typically fall under the exception—ones of violence and injury—and when considering that
state statutes excluding incarcerated workers from the definition of “employee” would ban conduct permitted by the NLRA.
As such, a court considering NLRA preemption under either
Weber or Garmon could find that the Act preempts such state
statutes.
E. Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions in Practice
Obstacles to incarcerated worker unionization will exist
even if the Board exercises its jurisdiction to find that these
workers are employees under the Act and a court finds that the
Act preempts any conflicting state statutes. Incarcerated
worker unions will also face legal and practical obstacles as
they begin to form and operate. The first of these obstacles
arises in the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision, Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc. There, an incarcerated
worker labor union brought suit against the North Carolina
Department of Correction, alleging that the Department violated the union’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when
it prohibited incarcerated workers from soliciting others to join
the union, barred union meetings, and refused to deliver union
publications mailed in bulk to the workers for distribution.143
In addressing these claims, the Court first noted that “[l]awful
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,” including the First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights at issue in the case.144 To determine the degree to which incarceration can limit these privileges and rights, the Court balanced the institutional needs
and objectives of prisons against certain constitutional
rights.145 The Court also granted wide-ranging deference to
prison administrators’ decisions regarding institutional objectives.146 In light of this deference, the Court in Jones found
that the Department’s “reasonable considerations of penal
management” did not “trench untowardly” on the inmates’ constitutional rights,147 and thus its restrictions on the union activity could stand.
143
144
145
146
147

See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 121 (1977).
Id. at 125.
See id. at 129.
See id. at 126, 128.
Id. at 131–32.
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The North Carolina Department of Correction’s restrictions
would certainly constitute violations of the NLRA. Yet, given
the outcome of Jones, prisons would likely put similar restrictions in place if incarcerated worker unions began to form after
a Board decision finding that these workers are employees
under the Act. Challenges to these restrictions would then
present courts with the task of reconciling Jones with the
Board’s finding. Courts could approach this task and find in
favor of incarcerated worker union activity in at least two ways.
First, a case regarding employer restrictions on incarcerated
worker organizing would present a court with an opportunity to
overrule Jones. Many scholars have argued that a court
should do just this. In an article on the future of incarcerated
worker unions after the Court’s decision in Jones, Regina Montoya and Paul Coggins argue that:
The [C]ourt offered three rationales for its decision in Jones.
First, the Court took the position that the judiciary should
play a very limited role in prison litigation, and that courts
should accord “wide-ranging deference to . . . the decisions of
prison administrators. Second, the Court expressed the view
that adequate alternatives for prisoners’ unions existed.
Third, the Court accepted the prison authorities’ assertion
that “the concept of a prisoners’ labor union was itself
fraught with potential dangers” to order and security. Each
of the three rationales underlying the Jones decision is
erroneous.148

Though the Court’s rationales in Jones may be erroneous, it is
possible that a court would not overturn its reasoning, which is
based in First and Fourteenth Amendment principles, in a case
arising under the NLRA.
However, a court deciding a case regarding employer restrictions on incarcerated worker organizing after a Board finding that these workers are employees under the Act could take
a second approach to prohibiting employer restrictions. A
court confronting such a case could distinguish Jones because
its holding is based in the First and Fourteenth Amendments
rather than the NLRA, and the court could then decline to
follow the reasoning in Jones in a case arising under the NLRA.
Such a decision would allow the court to avoid overturning
precedent but would also allow it to avoid the arguably flawed
reasoning in Jones. It would also allow the court to acknowl148
Regina Montoya & Paul Coggins, The Future of Prisoners’ Unions: Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 799, 801–02
(1978) (citations omitted).
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edge and effectuate the NLRA’s purpose—alleviating industrial
strife and unequal bargaining power between employers and
employees—a purpose that is not at issue under, and thus is
not properly addressed by reasoning based in, First and Fourteenth Amendment principles. In cases arising under the
NLRA, the NLRB and courts could instead follow established
Board law regarding employer restrictions on NLRA rights,
which would be less restrictive of incarcerated worker unionization than the Court’s holding in Jones.
Thus far, Part III of this Note has addressed and offered
solutions to a number of legal obstacles to incarcerated worker
unionization. The remainder of this Part seeks to overcome a
practical obstacle—envisioning and supporting incarcerated
worker labor unions as they form. Though incarcerated worker
labor unions may appear to be unlikely or untenable organizations, they are not without precedent.149 Between 1971 and
1975, unions formed in prisons in 13 states, and these unions
had more than 11,000 members combined.150 In nearly every
prison where there was a union, more than 90% of the incarcerated population wanted affiliation.151 The structure and demands of these unions varied from prison to prison. In 1971,
inmates at Green Haven Correctional Facility, outside of Manhattan, organized the Prisoners’ Labor Union at Green Haven
with the assistance of New York Legal Aid Society’s Prisoners’
Rights Project.152 The union notified the Green Haven superintendent that it wanted to be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for the inmates and requested a meeting for
negotiations on wages, hours, and working conditions.153 Inmates at the Ohio Penitentiary formed the Ohio Prisoners’ Labor Union in 1971 and set as its goals minimum-wage salaries
and workmen’s compensation for incarcerated workers, correcting dangerous working conditions, and encouraging private
industry to come into the institutions, among other things.154
Though the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Jones undercut
the growing prisoners’ union movement in the United
149
For detailed accounts of unions in U.S. prisons in the 1970s, see DONALD F.
TIBBS, FROM BLACK POWER TO PRISON POWER: THE MAKING OF JONES V. NORTH CAROLINA
PRISONERS’ LABOR UNION 155–58 (2012); C. Ronald Huff, Unionization Behind the
Walls, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 175, 183–86 (1974).
150
TIBBS, supra note 149, at 155.
151
Id. at 156.
152
Id. at 155.
153
Emanuel Perlmutter, Prisoners’ Union Formed Upstate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1972, at 1.
154
See Huff, supra note 149, at 178–83.
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States,155 incarcerated worker unions currently operate in
other countries. In Argentina, the Sindicato Único de
Trabajadores Privados de la Libertad Ambulatoria (“SUTPLA”),
a union formed in 2012 of people incarcerated in a Buenos
Aires prison, has 800 members and is recognized under an
agreement with the Federal Penitentiary Service.156 Leaders of
the Argentinean trade union federation to which SUTPLA belongs say that the International Labor Organization is closely
watching SUTPLA because it may serve as an example for other
countries to follow.157
In addition to examples from past and present incarcerated
worker unions, visions for the widespread operation of these
unions in the United States also come from scholars. In her
article on the feasibility of incarcerated worker labor unions,
Susan Blankenship suggests that these unions’ constitutions
could provide for elected leaders who frequently rotate out of
their positions in order to provide ample leadership opportunities for those who want them and to reduce the potential for
envy or resentment of inmates in these positions.158 Blankenship also envisions a non-adversarial, interest-based collective
bargaining context in which the parties would come to the bargaining table with proposals for reaching their shared goals.159
Scholars also acknowledge that the unique context of incarceration may call for some limitations on the unions that form
within it. In his analysis of proposals for incarcerated worker
labor unions, Paul R. Comeau notes that as in the case of
public employees, incarcerated workers might be denied the
right to strike—an outcome that institutions could justify with
considerations of safety and order both within and outside the
institution.160 Comeau also suggests that institutions could
limit the size of the audience to a union gathering or the location or time of such a gathering.161 Further, though incarcerated worker unions could call attention to and seek to address
155
See Susan Blankenship, Revisiting the Democratic Promise of Prisoners’
Labor Unions, in 37 STUD. L. POLS. & SOC’Y 241, 244 (Austin Sarat ed., 2005).
156
See Marcela Valente, First Prisoners’ Trade Union Defends Rights in Argentina, INTER PRESS SERV. (June 7, 2013), http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/firstprisoners-trade-union-defends-rights-in-argentina/ [http://perma.cc/7CK5VSLS].
157
Id.
158
See Blankenship, supra note 155, at 250.
159
See id. at 251.
160
See Paul R. Comeau, Labor Unions for Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a
Recent Proposal for the Organization of Inmate Labor, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 963, 973
(1971).
161
See id. at 973–74.
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prison conditions generally, the NLRA would only require employers to bargain with unions over wages, hours, and working
conditions.
In addition to envisioning how incarcerated worker unions
could operate, scholars, as well as courts,162 have acknowledged the potential benefits of these unions. In an article on
the causes of and ways to avoid prison riots, Vernon Fox argues
that “[s]ome type of inmate self-government that involves honest and well supervised elections of inmate representatives to
discuss problems, make recommendations, and, perhaps, even
take some responsibilities from the administration could be
helpful.”163 In an article on the need for restructuring of the
prison economic system, Sarah M. Singleton notes that incarcerated workers receiving equitable payment for work performed could be able to provide support for their family,
continue payments on social security, provide restitution if applicable to their case, and save money to assist themselves
upon their release from prison.164 Similarly, Comeau notes
that incarcerated worker unions that offer power to inmates
and that are designed to eliminate abuses in prisons could be
useful tools for the “genuine rehabilitation” of incarcerated individuals.165 Indeed, Comeau argues:
In the general labor force, employer acceptance of and cooperation with labor organization has resulted in a reduction of
union militancy and the stabilization of industrial relations.
If the formation of unions within correctional facilities would
have this effect, it is possible that administrators would have
legal and social responsibility to allow unionization.166

162
See Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F. 2d 1237, 1245–46 (2d Cir. 1972) (Oakes, J.,
concurring) (“Promoting or at least permitting the formation of a representative
agency might well be, in the light of past experience, the wisest course for correctional officials to follow.”); cf. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir.
1966) (noting that “[e]xperience teaches that nothing so provokes trouble for the
management of a penal institution as a hopeless feeling among inmates that they
are without opportunity to voice grievances or to obtain redress for abusive or
oppressive treatment.”).
163
Vernon Fox, Why Prisoners Riot, 35 FED PROB. 9 18 (1971).
164
Sara M. Singleton, Unionizing America’s Prisons—Arbitration and StateUse, 48 IND. L.J. 493, 501 (1972).
165
See Comeau, supra note 160, at 982–83. Comeau’s use of the term “genuine rehabilitation” works alongside the arguments of others who push back
against the use of the term “rehabilitation” to describe what actually occurs in
prisons. See Frank Browning, Organizing Behind Bars, RAMPARTS, Feb. 1972, at
43 (“Or as San Francisco Prisoners Union President Willie Holder puts it, rehabilitation is really only being reconstructed to accept prison life and authority.”).
166
Comeau, supra note 160, at 972 (citation omitted).
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CONCLUSION
In an article on the intersection between law and prisons,
Jonathan A. Willens writes:
The decision in Jones . . . presented the substance of imprisonment, what the prison will be, and the Court refused to
look. . . . [E]ven while refusing to look at the substance of
imprisonment, the Court legitimates a particular substance
by imposing and enforcing its legal structure. Because this
legal structure rests on a particular conception of what
prison is, the law creates a prison that increasingly reflects
this conception.167

In this way, courts and the law build prisons. In this way too,
the Board, courts, and the public currently have an opportunity to reshape the prisons that they have built. The Board’s
decision in Columbia University creates an opening for finding
that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA and
are thus able to form unions protected by the Act. Though a
number of obstacles will likely arise on the path to incarcerated
worker unionization, this Note offers solutions to these obstacles and argues that given the ways in which prison labor is a
form of modern-day slavery, the Board and courts should
adopt these solutions.

167
Jonathan A. Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War: American Prison Law After Twenty-Five Years 1962-1987, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 113
(1987).

